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TORT LAW-NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
IN ACCIDENT CASEs-The Expanding Definition of Lia­
bility-Dziokonski v. Babineau, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 380 
N. E.2d 1295. 
On October 24, 1973, a motor vehicle struck Norma 
Dziokonski as she left her school bus. 1 Within a few minutes Nor­
rna's mother, Lorraine Dziokonski, arrived at the accident scene 
and saw her injured daughter lying on the ground. After witnessing 
the injuries to her daughter, Mrs. Dziokonski suffered physical and 
emotional shock. She died in the ambulance that drove her daugh­
ter to the hospital. Norma's father, Anthony Dziokonski, later 
learned of his daughter's injuries and his wife's death. He suffered 
"an aggravated gastric ulcer, a coronary occlusion, physical and 
emotional shock, distress and anguish."2 He died twenty-three 
months after the accident because of these affiictions. 3 
The administratrix of the Dziokonskis' estates sued the school 
bus driver, the school bus owner, and the driver of the car that 
struck Norma, for the wrongful death and conscious suffering of 
both Mr. and Mrs. Dziokonski. After a Massachusetts Superior 
Court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim,4 the 
supreme judicial court ordered direct appellate review. 5 The court 
held that neither complaint should be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim even though "the weight of authority in this country would 
deny recovery."6 By this unprecedented decision, Massachusetts 
extended a defendant's potential liability for the negligent infliction 
of emotional distress further than any other jurisdiction. 
The development and gradual extension of the tort of negli­
1. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 1760, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 
1296 (1978). 
2. Id. at 1761,380 N.E.2d at 1296. 
3. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 8, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 78 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1759,380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). 
4. The controlling law in Massachusetts at the time of trial was the impact rule 
laid down in Spade v. Lynn & Boston RR, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). This 
holding was overruled in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 380 
N.E.2d 1295 (1978). See notes 10-11 infra. 
5. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 1760, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 
1296 (1978). 
6. Id. at 1766-67, 380 N.E.2d at 1299. 
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gent infliction of emotional distress has occurred in cases with re­
markably similar fact patterns. Typically, a parent witnesses an ac­
cident1 caused by a negligent defendant which results in death or 
injury to the parent's child. As a result of witnessing the accident, 
the parent suffers emotional shock or harm with ensuing physical 
injuries. 8 Three well-defined legal approaches have been applied to 
these cases. The impact rule was the earliest and most restrictive 
approach used to resolve these disputes. It was followed by the 
less restrictive zone of danger test and then further liberalized by 
the Dillon v. Legg9 approach which purportedly adopted a test of 
reasonable foreseeability. 
The earliest American decisions1o following the "impact rule" 
required a direct physical impact as a prerequisite to recovery for 
negligently inflicted emotional harm. The impact requirement was 
deemed necessary to protect the defendant from fraudulent 
claims. 11 Other justifications for the rule included the difficulty 
in establishing proximate causation,12 the fear of increased litiga­
7. The vast majority of these accidents involve automobiles. This is because the 
shock of seeing a loved one struck by an automobile is usually far more gruesome 
and overwhelming than the shock suffered from witnessing most other accidents. 
8. Massachusetts left open the question whether recovery can be had for emo­
tional shock or harm absent any physical injuries caused by negligent, grossly negli­
gent, wanton, or reckless conduct in McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 517, 313 
N.E.2d 435, 442 (1974). Recovery has been allowed for emotional distress absent any 
physical injury where the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous conduct 
and without privilege." Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2346, 2351, 
355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1976). 
9. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). This approach is 
named after the case in which it was first announced. 
10. The leading cases among these early decisions are Spade v. Lynn & Boston 
RR, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), and Mitchell v. Rochester RR, 151 N.Y. 107, 
45 N.E. 354 (1896). Mitchell was overruled in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 
N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). 
11. In Spade v. Lynn & Boston RR, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), the 
plaintiff was so frightened by the negligent conduct of an employee of the defendant 
railroad company in removing an unruly passenger that she sustained emotional 
shock and resulting physical injuries. The court realized that a physical injury might 
well result from negligently caused fright. It decided, however, that a rule allowing 
recovery absent an impact would be unjustifiable. The court stated, "The logical vin­
dication of [the impact] rule is that it is unreasonable to hold persons who are 
merely negligent bound to anticipate and guard against fright and the consequences 
of fright, and that this would open a wide door for unjust claims...." Id. at 286, 47 
N.E. at 89. 
12. In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 
29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), the court denied recovery absent an impact since "a difficult 
medical question is presented when it must be determined if emotional distress re­
sulted in physical injury." Id. at 311, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43. Amaya was 
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tion,13 and the possibility of unlimited liability.14 A strict applica­
tion of the rule prohibits recovery absent an impact regardless of 
the severity of the resulting injury. 
The potential harshness of this impact requirement and in­
creasing dissatisfaction with its justifications15 led to a relaxation of 
the rule that there be physical contact as a prerequisite to recov­
ery. Thus, courts have circumvented the rule by discovering some 
trivial impact16 in cases where recovery seems justified. Dissatisfac­
tion with the rule grew because its justifications were found inade­
quate. Courts have stated that the threat of fraudulent claims cannot 
justify retaining the rule. The purpose of our legal system is to de­
cide case-by-case whether the claims have merit. Denying all re­
covery merely in anticipation of unjust claims would erode the 
overruled in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 CaL RI?tr. 72 (1968). 
Due to the extreme difficulties in establishing the required proximate causation with 
any degree of certainty, the court refused to do away with the existing impact rule. 
13. In Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966), the court stated: "If 
we permitted recovery in a case such as this, our Courts would be swamped by a vir­
tual avalanche of cases for damages for many situations and cases hitherto 
unrecoverable...." [d. at 271, 220 A.2d at 647. 
14. Unlimited liability is a misnomer since liability could never actually be un­
limited. Rather, the term is used to describe the situation where a merely negligent 
defendant might be held liable for the emotional harm to many claimants. See notes 
71-73 infra and accompanying text. 
15. Neither volume of cases, nor danger of fraudulent claims, nor diffi­
culty of proof, will relieve the courts of their obligation in this regard. None 
of these problems are insuperable. Statistics fail to show that there has been 
a "flood" of such cases in those jurisdictions in which recovery is allowed; 
but if there be increased litigation, the courts must willingly cope with the 
task. As to the danger of illusory and fictional claims, this is not a new prob­
lem; our courts deal constantly with claims for pain and suffering based 
upon subjective symptoms only; and the courts and the medical profession 
have been found equai to the danger. Frauduient ciaims may be feigned in a 
slight-impact case as well as a no-impact case. Likewise, the problems of ad­
equacy of proof, for the avoidance of speculative and conjectural damages, 
are common to personal injury cases generally and are surmountable, being 
satisfactorily solved by our courts in case after case. 
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 463-64, 210 A.2d 709, 714 (1965) (footnote 
omitted). 
16. In Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R., 73 N.J. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906), the court 
acknowledged the fact that no recovery could be allowed for injuries due to fright or 
shock alone. The court stated, however, that if there was any physical impact, then 
there could be recovery for all resulting injuries whether they are emotionally or 
physically based. The court found that the impact requirement was satisfied because 
dust had gotten into the plaintiff's eyes. See also Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 
Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (evacuation of horse's bowels in lap of plaintiff 
held sufficient impact); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) 
(smoke inhaled by plaintiff held sufficient impact). 
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courts' adjudicatory function. 17 Furthermore, the difficulties in es­
tablishing proximate causation continually decrease as medical 
knowledge increases. IS Finally, jurisdictions which have allowed 
recovery absent an impact have not experienced vast increases in 
litigation. 19 
This frequent bending of the impact rule and the widespread 
discontent with its purported justifications, prompted most 
juristictions20 to replac~ it with the zone of danger test. 21 This test 
expanded liability by allowing recovery to a plaintiff who is within 
an area of potential physical harm at the time of the defendant's 
negligent act. A plaintiff can recover for injuries sustained as a di­
rect result of a physical impact or as a result of the emotional harm 
caused by the plaintiffs fear for his safety. This test, for example, 
allows one who narrowly escapes being struck by a negligent de­
fendant's automobile to recover if he was within the zone of dan­
ger. Recovery is justified on the grounds that a defendant can rea­
sonably foresee the possible harm to a person within the zone of 
danger.22 Once foreseeability is established, a duty of care arises, 23 
and it is immaterial whether an impact actually occurS. 24 Most 
courts have found the zone of danger test an equitable and consis­
17. Robb v. Pennsylvania RR., 58 Del. 454, 463, 210 A.2d 709, 714 (1965); 
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). 
18. See note 78 infra. Since medical science has become more adept at tracing 
physical or emotional injuries back to their original sources, mere speculative claims 
can be more frequently denied recovery. See, e.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 
Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W. 2d 259, 263 (1969); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 
410-11,261 A.2d 84, 88-89 (1970). 
19. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania RR, 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); see 
note 15 supra. 
20. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 app. (1966 & Supp. 1977) 
(listing states which still follow impact rule). 
21. The case commonly regarded as the first to adopt the zone of danger test is 
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). In Waube, the court held 
that one put in peril of physical harm could recover for injuries sustained absent 
physical impact. While the court adopted the zone of danger test, it denied recovery 
to the plaintiff because she was not located within the zone of danger. 
22. This same requirement of reasonable foreseeability has also led most juris­
dictions to deny recovery to plaintiffs outside of the zone of danger. They have re­
fused to find any duty of care owed to one who was not in any threat of personal 
danger since there is no reasonable foreseeability of harm. See, e.g., Waube v. 
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 
728, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72. 
23. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 43, at 251 (4th ed. 1971). 
24. Id. § 54, at 331-33. Prosser states that there should be some requirement of 
satisfactory proof and that there should be no recovery for hypersensitive mental dis­
turbance where a normal person would not be affected under the circumstances. 
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tent approach in determining liability. Attempts to extend liability 
beyond the zone of danger were initially unsuccessful because the 
courts feared that without this fixed boundary they would have no 
logical way to limit potential claims. 
The 1968 Dillon decision in California marked a major change 
in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases by replacing the 
zone of danger test with a test of reasonable foreseeability. In 
Dillon, a child was struck and killed by a negligent automobile 
driver as the child's mother and sister watched. Although the sister 
was arguably located within the zone of danger, the mother was 
not; The court decided it would be unreasonable to allow only the 
sister to recover merely because she was a few yards closer to the 
accident. Finding the zone of danger test too arbitrary,25 the court 
discarded it, holding that both the mother and sister could recover 
for the emotional distress caused by the defendant's negligence. 
The court adopted reasonable foreseeability as a more appropriate 
test for determining liability and announced three guidelines for 
determining whether the emotional harm was reasonably fore­
seeable: 
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident 
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. 
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact 
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance 
of the accident, as contrasted with the learning of the accident 
from others after its occurrence. 
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as con­
trasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of 
only a distant relationship. 26 
These three guidelines can be categorized respectiv~ly as physical 
proximity, sensory proximity, and emotional proximity. 
The Dillon approach has generally been rejected. In only two 
states, Hawaii and Rhode Island, have the highest courts27 adopted 
25. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
26. ld. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. These guidelines were to 
be applied case-by-case in order to alleviate the injustices under the zone of danger 
approach. 
27. Lower courts in Connecticut and Michigan have also followed the Dillon 
approach. The Connecticut case, however, could have been decided under the zone 
of danger test since the plaintiffs were within the zone of danger. D'Amicol v. 
Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (Super. Ct. 1973) (recovery 
allowed when parents witnessed the death of their child when car in which all three 
were riding was struck by negligent defendant); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 
647,207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) {recovery allowed when mother, outside zone of danger, 
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the Dillon rationale. The Hawaii court followed the California lead 
in Leong v. Takasaki,28 but decided that the guidelines set down 
in Dillon were merely an expansion of the zone of danger test and 
still included arbitrary barriers to recovery.29 Mr. Chief Justice 
William S. Richardson, writing for the majority, in the Leong deci­
sion, said that the better approach in determining liability should 
require only that "it be reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable 
plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be able to cope with the 
mental stress engendered...."30 Thus, the determination of liabil­
ity in Hawaii is not based upon whether the defendant should rea­
sonably have foreseen the plaintiff's presence at the accident. 
Rather, the court considers whether the plaintiff's failure to cope 
with the stress is reasonable. The court further explained that the 
Dillon criteria of physical, sensory, and emotional proximity should 
only be used in determining the degree of mental stress suffered 
and not in determining liability. 31 
Rhode Island also followed a limited Dillon approach in 
D'Ambra v. United States32 by permitting recovery to a mother­
witness located outside the zone of danger. The court carefully lim­
ited its decision only to cases involving the relationship of mother 
and child and acknowledged that it was actually bending the zone 
of danger test rather than eliminating it. This relaxation of the zone 
witnessed the death of her daughter when struck by a panel truck driven by negli­
gent defendant). 
28. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). In Leong, an action was brought on be­
half of a ten-year-old boy who suffered mental distress from seeing his grandmother 
killed by defendant's automobile. Although the case could arguably have been de­
cided under the zone of danger test, the court decided to eliminate this artificial bar­
rier to recovery. Id. at 402-07, 520 P.2d at 762-64. Furthermore, the court held that 
the absence of a blood relationship should not foreclose recovery. This was based 
upon the Hawaiian concept of adoption whereby the child is reared as a child of the 
adoptive family and is entitled to inherit through them. Id. at 410-Il, 520 P.2d at 
766. 
29. Id. at 409, 520 P.2d at 765. This finding was based upon the initial Dillon 
requirement of proximity of the plaintiff to the accident. 
30. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765. 
31. Id. at 410, 52Q..,P.2d at 765-66. These factors are only indicative of the de­
gree of stress suffered;:~ha:'go only to damages. The Leong decision concludes that 
the defendant is liablti·:aS'Iong as the plaintiff witnessed the accident and his re­
sulting emotional harm was not unreasonable. The Dillon factors are to be used in 
determining the extent of damages but not in determining the threshold question of 
liability. Thus, for example, a defendant can be liable absent a close physical prox­
imity to the accident, but the trier of fact will consider that factor in determining 
damages. 
32. Il4 R.1. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975) (driver of a mail truck negligently struck 
and killed four-year-old boy as mother witnessed from position of safety). 
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of danger test was, according to the court, an exception for mother­
child relationship cases rather than an unqualified acceptance of 
the Dillon approach. 33 
While only two jurisdictions have followed the Dillon expan-_ 
sion of liability, many have rejected it. 34 New York was the first to 
do so in Tobin v. Grossman. 35 In Tobin, a mother inside a neigh­
bor's house heard the screech of tires and noted the absence of her 
two-year-old son. She immediately went outside and saw him lying 
injured on the ground. She sought recovery for injuries sustained 
as a result of viewing her son's injuries. In denying recovery, the 
court examined the foreseeability test of Dillon and concluded: "If 
foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is extended the 
logic of the principle would not and could not remain confined. It 
would extend to older children, fathers, grandparents, relatives, or 
others in loco parentis, and even to sensitive caretakers, or even 
any other affected bystanders. "36 This fear of nearly unlimited lia­
bility has led New York, as well as other jurisdictions,37 to reject 
Dillon and follow the zone of danger test. 
In Dziokonski v. Babineau,38 the Massachusetts Supreme Ju­
dicial Court abrogated the then existing impact rule, by-passing 
both the zone of danger and Dillon approaches, and adopted its 
own version of a reasonable foreseeability test. The impact rule had 
been followed in Massachusetts since the 1897 decision of Spade v. 
Lynn & Boston R.R.39 Realizing, however, that the primary justifi­
33. The court's explanation for bending the zone of danger test to allow recov­
ery in mother-child cases was that this close emotional relationship required greater 
protection. According to the court, "[W]here a mother witnesses the death of her 
child, it is only reasonable that the parameters of liability established by the zone of 
physicai danger be bent to accommodate the overwheiming impact of the mother's 
and child's mental and emotional relationship. Anything less would be to deny psy­
chological reality." ld. at 657, 338 A.2d at 531. 
34. E.g., Arcia v. Altagracia Corp., 264 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); 
Strickland v. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1975); Aragon v. Speelman, 
83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (1971); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,249 N.E.2d 
419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 
1972); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Guilmette v. 
Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 
P.2d 291 (1975). 
35. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). 
36. ld. at 616,249 N.E.2d at 423,301 N.Y.S.2d at 559. 
37. See note 34 supra. 
38. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). See notes 1-6 supra and 
accompanying text for the facts and holding of Dziokonski. 
39. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). See note 10 supra for facts of Spade and 
justifications given for adopting the impact rule. 
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cation given for the impact rule in Spade was the threat of unjust 
claims,40 the court decided that this treat alone could no longer 
justify denial of recovery in all cases and overruled Spade. 41 The 
court decided that the determination of whether a claim was 
justified was best left for the trier of fact. 42 The court relied heavily 
on the Dillon rationale in adopting its own test of reasonable 
foreseeability.43 The adopted test is based on a determination of 
where, when, and how the plaintiff learned of the injury to the 
third person and by the relationship existing between the plaintiff 
and the injured party. These factors were deemed "relevant in 
measuring the limits of liability for emotionally based injuries re­
sulting from a defendant's negligence. "44 
In adopting a test of pure reasonable foreseeability the 
Dziokonski court sought to eliminate any artificial barriers to recov­
ery. In the court's view, if real injuries are sustained, and a causal 
connection can be established between those injuries and the de­
fendant's negligence, then a defendant ought to be held liable for 
the consequences of his negligence. The only limitation the court 
placed on this determination was that the injury sustained must be 
reasonably foreseeable. 45 Thus, the Dziokonski court has appar­
ently forsaken the arbitrary barriers to recovery found in the im­
pact rule, the zone of danger test, and the Dillon approach, in fa­
vor of a test of pure reasonable foreseeability. 
The Dziokonski court attempted to arrange a more equitable 
method of determining liability than the Dillon court did. The de­
vised test may not be more equitable, however, because it is too 
amorphous to be applied uniformly. The factors deemed relevant 
by the Dziokonski court in determining liability are similar to those 
used in Dillon. 46 While not as narrow or restrictive47 as the Dillon 
40. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1762, 380 N.E.2d at 1297. 
41. Id. at 1766,380 N.E.2d at 1299. For a discussion of the various other justifi­
cations for the impact rule, see notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text. 
42. Id. at 1766-67,380 N.E.2d at 1299. 
43. Id. at 1775,380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
44. Id. at 1775-76,380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
45. Id. at 1774,380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
46. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
47. This flexibility was an attempt to further eliminate any arbitrary barriers to 
recovery. Indeed the court acknowledged this fact that "[elvery effort must be made 
to avoid arbitrary lines which 'unnecessarily produce incongruous and indefensible 
results:" 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1775, 380 N.E.2d at 1302 (quoting Mone v. Grey­
hound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 365, 331 N.E.2d 916, 922 (1975) (Braucher, J., dis­
senting)). 
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guidelines, they still attempt to focus the determination of liability on 
the same issues, namely, where, when, and how the plaintiff be­
came aware of the injury to the third person. In Dillon the prereq­
uisites to finding liability were close proximity to the accident, 
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and 
close family relationship.48 The Dziokonski decision does not indi­
cate what events are required to establish liability. Thus, a deter­
mination under Dziokonski of where the plaintiff learned of the in­
jury requires an inquiry similar to that of Dillon into plaintiff's 
proximity to the accident. Unlike the Dillon insistence upon close 
proximity, however, Dziokonski does not prohibit recovery to one 
who was distant from the accident. Mr. Dziokonski, for example, 
never appeared at the scene of the accident, yet the court refused 
to dismiss his claim against the defendants. Clearly, under the 
Dillon test Mr. Dziokonski's complaint would be dismissed for fail­
ure to state a claim. The difficulty with the generalized factors as 
set down in Dziokonski is that they offer little guidance for an ulti­
mate decision on liability. The new test merely requires that lower 
courts, in determining liability, focus attention on where, when, 
and. how the plaintiff learned of the accident. It does not instruct 
the courts as to what effect to give to the findings on each of these 
issues. This relatively boundless test will result in inconsistencies 
in subsequent decisions. Moreover, it greatly increases the chances 
of a finding of liability based upon the desire of a sympathetic jury 
to compensate an injured plaintiff. 
Arbitrary barriers to recovery are necessary to protect defen­
dants49 and guide lower courts to a practical and uniform determi­
nation of liability. An analysis of post-Dillon California cases shows 
the difficulties in arriving at practical and uniform results despite 
Dillon's comparatively restrictive guidelines. This analysis also 
demonstrates that California courts are not currently using a pure 
reasonable foreseeability test, but rather are sharpening the bound­
aries imposed by Dillon. 
The first California case to apply the Dillon approach was 
Archibald v. Braverman50 which further defined the Dillon bound­
aries of liability. In Archibald, the defendant negligently sold gun­
powder to the plaintiff's thirteen-year-old son. The gunpowder ex­
ploded and seriously injured the boy. Within moments of the 
48. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
49. See text accompanying note 74 infra. 
50. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). 
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explosion, the plaintiff-mother appeared in an effort to aid her son. 
Although she was not an eyewitness to the accident the mother did 
hear;! the explosion and saw the severe injuries suffered by her 
son. As a result, she suffered fright, shock, and mental illness and 
required institutionalization. 52 
In applying the Dillon criteria, the appellate court had no dif­
ficulty in satisfying the requirements of physical proximity53 and a 
close family relationship. 54 The difficulty arose in satisfying the sec­
ond Dillon requirement of a sensory and contemporaneous observ­
ance of the accident as the plaintiff had not viewed the accident. 
The court, without discussing the issue, held this requirement was 
satisfied because "the shock of seeing a child severely injured im­
mediately after the tortious event may be just as profound as that 
experienced in witnessing the accident itself. Consequently, the 
shock sustained by the mother herein was 'contemporaneous' with 
the explosion so as to satisfy the 'observance' factor."55 Thus, 
Archibald further defined the "sensory and contemporaneous ob­
servance" criteria of Dillon to include hearing the accident as well 
as seeing the accident. 
Rather than employ a test of reasonable foreseeability, lower 
court decisions since Archibald have continually clarified and de­
fined the Dillon guidelines. Recovery has been denied in subse­
quent decisions where a wife witnessed her husband's condition in 
the hospital emergency room thirty to sixty minutes after an acci­
dent,56 where parents witnessed the lengthy developments of an 
51. While the decision as reported does not expressly state that the mother 
heard the explosion, that fact has been noted in subsequent California decisions. See, 
e.g., Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
883 (1973), where the court, in discussing Archibald stated that, "it can be inferred 
that the mother heard the explosion, thus having a 'sensory observance of it.' " Id. at 
24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885. 
52. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724. 
53. "[Tlhe mother, having witnessed the injuries within moments after the ex­
plosion at a time when she was attempting to render aid, fulfilled the 'nearness' re­
quirement in terms of distance as well as time." Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. 
54. "[Tlhe 'relationship' factor was indisputably established inasmuch as the 
plaintiff and the accident victim are mother and son." Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724. 
55. Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. But see D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. 
Supp. 810, 821 (D.R.1. 1973) (criticizing the conclusion reached in Archibald). This 
satisfaction of the contemporaneous observance requirement in Archibald may also 
have been influenced by the court's awareness of the defendant's criminal violation 
for selling gunpowder to a minor (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12082 (Deering 
1975». 275 Cal. App. 2d at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. This may have raised the de­
fendant's culpability above that of mere negligence. 
56. Deboe v. Hom, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971). In Deboe, the 
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infection in their child rather than a sudden accident,57 and where 
plaintiffs did not actually witness the accident. 58 
In Arauz v. Gerhardt59 the court denied recovery to a mother 
who arrived upon the scene within five minutes of the accident and 
saw her son's severe injuries. In denying recovery, the court dis­
tinguished Arauz from Archibald since the mother in Archibald 
had heard the accident which caused her son's injuries while the 
mother in Arauz had not. 60 Clearly, the Arauz court did not em­
ploy a pure reasonable foreseeability test. A defendant can reason­
ably foresee emotional harm to a mother who views her son's se­
vere injuries moments after an accident. A requirement that the 
mother also hear the accident is not necessary for this determina­
tion. Rather than employ a reasonable foreseeability test, the 
Arauz decision further defined the Dillon limitations on liability. 
The contemporaneous observance criterion therefore requires ei­
ther a visual or aural observance of the accident. 
This same attempt at limiting liability by using the Dillon barri­
ers to recovery is evident in Justus v. Atchison. 61 InJustus, a hus­
band was present in the hospital delivery room with his wife when 
medical complications arose. 62 He was still present in the delivery 
wife contended that a general allegation of negligence resulting in injury was suffi­
cient to state a cause of action. The court dismissed the complaint stating "that facts 
giving rise to a cause of action for injuries resulting from emotional distress must be 
specifically pleaded. Since plaintiff-wife failed to do so here, the demurrer was prop­
erly sustained." [d. at 224, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. The court went on to say that even 
if she had done so liability would not exist since she never appeared at the scene of 
the accident as required under Dillon. 
57. Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. 
Rptr. 883 (1973). In Jansen, rather than rely on the reasonable foreseeability test, the 
court held that the language of Dillon contemplates recovery only when there is "a 
sudden and brief eVent causing the child's injur,.. .. . [and] ta'iat the eVent causing in­
jury to the child must itself be one which can be the subject of sensory perception." 
Id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85. 
58. Although it is true . . . that the rule allowing recovery for emotional 
shock and its after effect is not necessarily limited to the narrow facts in­
volved in [Dillon) ... we do not think that this court (especially in light of 
the strong dissents in Dillon) should extend the rule to a case such as this 
where the shock, as claimed, resulted from seeing the daughter 30 to 60 minutes 
after the accident and thereafter under circumstances not materially different 
from those undergone by every parent whose child has been injured in a 
non-observed and antecedent accident. 
Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 873-74, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874 (1974). See 
also, Parsons v. County of Monterey, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978). 
59. 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977). 
60. [d. at 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 626. See note 51 supra. 
61. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). 
62. These included the concern of the medical staff, use of emergency proce­
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room when the physician announced the death of the fetus. Recov­
ery was denied for the emotional harm he suffered because at the 
moment of death the fetus was hidden from the husband's contem­
poraneous perception. 63 Justus has continued to define the barriers 
imposed by Dillon by requiring not only presence at the accident 
but also an actual observance. In Justus, no such observance was 
found. Again, liability would certainly be established under a pure 
reasonable foreseeability test. The explanation for denying recovery 
is that Justus follows the Dillon barriers to recovery. 64 
The most recent California Supreme Court decision to address 
the Dillon issue was Krouse v. Graham. 65 In Krouse, a husband re­
mained in the driver's seat of his car while his wife and neighbor re­
moved groceries from the back seat. As his wife went to close the 
back door of the car, the defendant's vehicle struck both women and 
then collided with the plaintiff's car.66 The husband saw the defend­
ant's vehicle approaching and realized it must have hit his wife prior 
to striking his car. Although he did not actually see his wife being 
struck by the defendant's vehicle, the California Supreme Court de­
cided that he fully perceived that she had been struck and therefore 
must be deemed a percipient witness. 67 
While Krouse could have been decided on the mere fact that 
dures, and the prolapsing of the umbilical cord of the fetus. Id. at 564, 565 P.2d at 
122, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 97. 
63. In the words of the court, "he had been admitted to the theater but the 
drama was being played on a different stage." Id. at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. at llO. 
64. Another possible explanation for the decision reached in Justus is that the 
California court is retreating from the Dillon-Archibald approach. The facts ofJustus 
appear to establish a greater showing of "contemporaneous observance" than 
Archibald. However, the court explicitly distinguished Justus from Archibald in that 
the plaintiff in Archibald was able to sense the accident, whereas the plaintiff in 
Justus was not. Id. at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at llO. The California Su­
preme Court itself endorsed the Archibald decision stating: 
Decisional law has also imposed on the remedy temporal limitations 
which flow from Dillon's requirement that the injury result "from the sen­
sory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, ..." .... 
We confirm the propriety of the expression in Archibald, supra, that the 
Dillon requirement of "sensory and contemporaneous observance of the ac­
cident" does not require a visual perception of the impact causing the death 
or injury. 
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 76, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 872 
(1977) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
72, 80 (1968)). 
65. Id. at 59, 562 P.2d at 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 863. 
66. Id. at 65, 562 P.2d at 1024, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 865. 
67. Id. at 72, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
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the plaintiff must have heard the accident, the court failed to raise 
this point. Instead, the court granted recovery because the plaintiff 
had "perceived" the accident. Thus, the "contemporaneous percep­
tion" requirement, after Krouse, may also be satisfied by a sensory 
perception of the accident absent both visual or aural perception. 
This supreme court decision has defined even further the Dillon 
barriers to recovery. 
These California decisions have not implemented the Dillon ap­
proach by relying on a reasonable foreseeability test. Rather, they 
have been based on the arbitrary guidelines promulgated by Dillon. 
The Dziokonski reliance on Dillon to establish a pure reasonable 
foreseeability test, therefore, is misplaced. California's continued 
adherence to and interpretation of the Dillon limits to recovery is in 
sharp contrast with the more liberal approach to liability taken by 
the Massachusetts court. The Dziokonski language offers far less 
guidance to the lower courts than Dillon. Although Dziokonski aims 
to eliminate the use of any arbitrary barriers to recovery,68 these 
barriers are the best practical way to limit liability. The difficulties 
and inconsistencies of the most recent California decisions illustrate 
the problems in attempting to apply even the limited foreseeability 
test of Dillon. 
The Dziokonski decision itself illustrates that a test of reason­
able foreseeability is inappropriate when applied to cases involving 
negligent infliction of emotional harm. Concededly there is some 
point at which a court will refuse to extend liability for injuries it 
deems too remote. The Dziokonski court acknowledged this fact 
stating, "In some instances, it will be clear that the question is 
properly one for the trier of fact, while in others the claim will fall 
outside the range of circumstances within which there may be lia­
bility. "69 By refusing to dismiss the claim relating to Mr. 
Dziokonski, the court has decided that a plaintiff who never ap­
pears at the scene of the accident, but who merely learns of the ac­
cident from another, has stated a cause of action. This holding has 
greatly increased the potential liability of a defendant far beyond 
that existing in California or any other jurisdiction. 70 
68. See note 47 supra. 
69. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1776, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
70. Even Hawaii, the state to adopt the most liberal Dillon approach, prior to 
Dziokonski, would not allow recovery for an injury as remote as Mr. Dziokonski's. In 
Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975), the 
Hawaii court was faced with an injury suffered by one who never appeared at the 
scene of the accident. The court decided "that the duty of care enunciated [in previ­
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An additional problem with a pure reasonable foreseeability 
test is that the class of people who can reasonably be foreseen to 
suffer emotional harm from an accident which causes injuries to an­
other is very large. 71 A defendant who negligently strikes a single 
pedestrian will, under a pure reasonable foreseeability test, con­
ceivably find himself liable to the pedestrian's mother, father, 
spouse, children, distant relatives, and perhaps even his friends. 
As other courts72 have acknowledged there is no logical place to 
deny recovery under this test. 73 Reasonable foreseeability is an in­
adequate test since in application it evolves as either too broad a 
determinant of liability or must be applied with illogical limita­
tions. 
A pure reasonable foreseeability test also produces a risk of lia­
bility disproportionate to the culpability of the defendant. The law 
of torts seeks to strike a balance between the wrongfulness of the 
defendant's act and the resulting harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
The degree of the defendant's culpability is a factor in determining 
both liability and damages. Thus, punitive damages may be al­
lowed in cases of intentional acts but never for negligent acts. The 
negligent defendant has not acted with any sense of hostility or in­
tent but is guilty only of an error of judgment-a mistake. Rather 
than unduly burden a merely negligent defendant the law often re­
quires a closer nexus of causation than would be required if the de­
fendant's act was intentional. 74 Reasonable foreseeability is an inap­
propriate approach for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
situations. Since the class of people affected may be very large, 
ous Hawaii cases] applies to plaintiffs ... who were located within a reasonable dis­
tance from the scene of the accident." ld. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. The reason for 
requiring a physical proximity to the accident was because "[wlithout a reasonable 
and proper limitation of the scope of the duty of care owed by [defendants, defend­
ants] would be confronted with an unmanageable, unbearable and totally 
unpredictable liability." ld. 
71. This becomes especially true in light of the fact that it has been noted by 
medical authorities that a shock suffered from merely being told of an accident 
"could actually be worse in some cases because a person who was not present and 
did not observe the circumstances in which the loved one died or was injured, could 
very well imagine a scene much more gruesome and a vision of death much more 
horrible than actually happened." Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Dis­
tress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 196 n.79 (1976-1977). 
72. See, e.g., Tobin, discussed at notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text. 
73. This argument was noted by the court in Dziokonski but discarded since 
any alternative test would involve using arbitrary lines to recovery. 78 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1774-75,380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
74. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 606, 258 N.W. 497, 501 
(1935). 
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some barriers are necessary to balance the defendant's liability with 
his culpability. A merely negligent defendant should not be held 
responsible for an injury as remote as Mr. Dziokonski's. 
Whatever test is adopted must contain some barriers to recov­
ery in order to operate both functionally and equitably. The best 
test for deciding these cases is one which does not permit recovery 
beyond that class of persons who are actually present at and 
witness the accident. 75 While this test obviously involves arbitrary 
barriers to recovery, such barriers have been shown to be neces­
sary. Judge Quirico's dissent in Dziokonski also stated that this test 
was the most appropriate: 
I would agree also that if, contrary to the facts in the pres­
ent case, a parent had been present at the time of the alleged 
negligent conduct which caused the injury, and such parent had 
suffered emotional distress and resulting physical injury, then he 
or she should recover regardless of whether they were within 
the zone of risk of bodily harm created by the negligent act. 76 
Additionally, the witness requirement significantly decreases the 
number of possible claimants. Thus, a negligent defendant's poten­
tial liability will be far less likely than it would be under a reasona­
ble foreseeability test. This test can also be applied with ease and 
certainty and provide for more consistent results than a reasonable 
foreseeability test. A further requirement of a close familial rela­
tionship should also be necessary. 77 
This proposed test is similar to the test currently being fol­
lowed in California. The cases after Dillon, which have clarified 
and defined the California approach, have reached the same result 
as this proposed test. In practice, this test expands the zone of 
danger test by requiling only presence at and perception of the ac­
cident. Extending liability beyond the zone of danger test will al­
low recovery for those emotional based harms that can be accu­
75. This test is similar to the approach currently being followed in California. 
The witnessing should include both visual and aural observance. A benefit of a con­
cise, definite statement of the rule is to eliminate the confusion and inconsistencies 
the courts are faced with when attempting to interpret a test such as "sensory and 
contemporaneous observance." 
76. 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1779, 380 N.E.2d at 1303 (footnote omitted) (Quirico, 
J., dissenting). 
77. This should certainly include parent-child and spousal relationships. Once 
a lesser degree of relationship is present (e.g. grandparent-grandchild) the issue 
should be left to the trier of fact. It will depend on the closeness of the particular re­
lationship in question. 
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rately shown to have a causal relationship to the accident 
witnessed. Current medical knowledge can adequately establish 
the required showing of proximate causation. 78 This approach 
would recognize that the mere presence at and witnessing of an ac­
cident involving a close relative can have devastating emotional ef­
fects. 79 At the same time, it would not permit recovery to every­
one who may be affected by an injury to a third person. 80 
Any concrete guidelines can be criticized as being inequitable 
if they are too arbitrary. Presumably, tort law must impose some 
limits on liability. The alternative, compensating all injuries regard­
less of their remoteness, would overload the capacity of our judicial 
system to determine who is to blame for plaintiff's injuries. The 
choice, therefore, is not whether there should be guidelines, but 
whether the guidelines should be flexible or concrete. 
Flexible guidelines have several advantages. They can pre­
clude the bright line distinctions that lead to inequitable results. 
Without hard and fast rules limiting liability, courts would not have 
to harshly deny recovery to an injured plaintiff because no impact 
occurred, because he was outside the zone of danger, or because 
he did not perceive the accident. 
There are disadvantages, however, to this alternative. The pri­
mary weakness of the reasonable foreseeability test outlined by the 
78. In recent years . . . the medical profeSSion has made tremendous ad­
vances in diagnosing and evaluating emotional and mental injuries. While 
psychiatry and psychology may not be exact sciences, they can now provide 
sufficiently reliable information concerning causation and treatment of psy­
chic injuries, to provide a jury with an intelligent basis for evaluating a par­
ticular claim. In this light, we are confident that juries are capable of as­
sessing whether a claim is concocted and fictitious or, in fact, real. 
Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. 1978). Towns, decided just two 
weeks prior to Dziokonski, rejected the impact rule and replaced it with the zone of 
danger test as adopted by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 app. (1966). 579 
P.2d at 1165. This faith in the medical profession is also shared by Prosser. "Not 
only fright and shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked by definite phys­
ical symptoms, which are capable of clear medical proof. It is entirely possible to al­
low recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is nothing to 
corroborate the claim...." W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971) 
(footnotes omitted). 
79. See generally Leibson, supra note 71. 
80. Judge Quirico, dissenting in Dziokonski, also decided this test was the ap­
propriate one to implement and that recovery should not be allowed to one who sub­
sequently comes upon the scene of the accident; 
It is my opinion that we should not prescribe rules that allow or deny recov­
ery by the parent on the basis of the speed and efficiency of an ambulance 
team in responding to an accident call, or on the haste with which a parent 
can be notified and rushed to the accident scene. 
78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1779,380 N.E.2d at 1304 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
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Dziokonski court is its indefiniteness. The test is too flexible. It j.s 
inevitable that many subjective considerations unrelated to the lia­
bility issue will creep into the determination of whether a specific 
plaintiff's case falls within the reasonable foreseeability rubric. The 
wide range of subjective considerations present in both jury and 
judge determinations under this test will necessarily lead to incon­
sistent results. Concrete guidelines, on the other hand, provide the 
objective standards by which individual cases can be uniformly ad­
judicated. 
Massachusetts' decision in Dziokonski to expand liability in 
negligent infliction of emotional harm cases by adopting a test of 
reasonable foreseeability is patently unwise. Its reliance upon the 
Dillon case is also misplaced' conSidering California's current ap­
proach of clarifying and defining the barriers to recovery an­
nounced in Dillion. A test of reasonable foreseeability is neither 
functional nor equitable in application. It offers little guidance to 
the lower courts in determining the ultimate issue of liability. 
Rather, the Dziokonski approach allows juries to impose liability 
according to their sympathies. A better balancing of plaintiff's 
rights with the degree of care owed by defendants is achieved by 
establishing some arbitrary barriers to recovery. A test which re­
quires both presence at and perception of an accident, either 
aurally or visually, realistically accounts for these factors. 
Robert M. Taylor, III 
